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the Release of Information
1. Introduction
o ensure repayment of borrowed funds, lenders require that 
borrowers undergo costly credit evaluations. In the financial 
sector, credit often flows along chains of borrowers and lenders 
who are already familiar with each other’s creditworthiness—a 
process that minimizes the cost of credit evaluations. However, if 
the creditworthiness of key participants along a chain is called into 
question, the chain can break and cut off the flow of credit to final 
borrowers. If enough chains in the economy break, a financial 
crisis can ensue, investment by final borrowers can dry up, and 
output can decline.
The flow of credit can stop because a lender believes a borrower 
has a high default probability or because a lender is uncertain 
about whether a borrower has a high default probability. The latter 
may often be the more likely scenario. For example, in a classic 
bank run, it is unlikely that depositors know the probability that 
their bank will become insolvent, but it is likely that they worry 
about the possibility that their bank has high default probability 
and withdraw their deposits as a precaution.1
More generally, a decision maker faces risk if the outcomes in 
his decision problem are random; he faces uncertainty if the 
outcomes are random and he does not know the probabilities of 
the outcomes.2 For example, when lenders are uncertain, they 
cannot assign a single figure to a borrower’s default probability, so 
they instead assign a range. During economic expansions, this 
range may be small, such as 1/4 to 1/2 percent; however, during 
economic downturns, the range may be 2 to 5 percent. If a lender 
is uncertainty-averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), 
it will charge spreads based on the high end of its range. This 
decision will be unimportant during expansions, when the range 
is narrow, but during downturns the required spread may be so 
high that a borrower cannot afford a loan—and the flow of credit 
from that borrower to any borrowers farther along the lending 
chain will be cut off.3
This paper addresses how central banks can resuscitate 
lending chains by providing information that reduces 
1 Easley and O’Hara (2009) argue that deposit insurance was instituted to 
eliminate bank runs motivated by uncertainty among small depositors because 
it allays the worries of small depositors that their bank will become insolvent. 
In a similar vein, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) model an excessive 
flight to quality and flight to liquid assets that can occur when there is 
uncertainty over the timing of liquidity shocks—and argue for government 
intervention aimed at reversing the flight. 
2 For examples of different methods of modeling decision making under 
uncertainty in nondynamic settings, see the discussion and approach in Rigotti 
and Shannon (2005) as well as the approaches in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and 
Mukerji (2005) and Easley and O’Hara (2009). For an overview of uncertainty 
in dynamic settings, see Hansen and Sargent (2007) and their references.
3 In this paper, the terms “lending chain” and “credit chain” are used 
interchangeably.
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Note: Borrower D needs a short-term loan, and saver A has excess short-term 
funds. Because A and B,  B and C, and C and D have had previous borrowing 
relationships, a lending chain from A to B to C to D is the least expensive way 
to fund D’s loan since there is no need for costly credit evaluations. 
uncertainty about participants along the chains. This action has 
been taken before: the Bank Holiday of 1933, declared by 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, resolved uncertainty 
about the health of individual banks by using bank inspections 
to publicly identify which banks were sound. This event 
restored the flow of funds to the banking sector and facilitated 
bank lending. During the 2007-09 financial crisis, the Federal 
Reserve used “stress tests” to measure and report on the health 
of large banks in the U.S. banking system and to identify those 
banks that required shoring up through capital injections.
In addition to providing information to the financial sector, 
central banks have other tools at their disposal to revive 
lending. When credit chains involve financial intermediaries 
such as banks, central banks can lower their target rates to 
reduce intermediaries’ costs of borrowing, accept a wider range 
of collateral, guarantee interbank loans, or shore up banks’ 
health through capital injections. Alternatively, they can bypass 
intermediaries altogether and lend directly to final borrowers 
in credit chains.
Each of these tools has merit in some situations—but none 
is perfect. Monetary easing may lower target rates to 0, but if 
credit spreads remain too high, lending along credit chains may 
still cease. Broadening the range of acceptable collateral, loan 
guarantees, and government-sponsored capital injections 
increases lending, but it can also increase the central bank’s 
exposure to credit and market risk. Direct lending outside the 
financial sector may reduce lending efficiency, because such 
intermediation is not a central bank’s usual function.
Under conditions of less uncertainty, many of these efforts 
would be less costly and more effective. This statement is 
intuitive, as it is easier to convince potential lenders that a 
solvency problem has been fixed if they have better 
information about the scope of the problem. It follows that 
during a crisis, steps to reduce uncertainty through 
information provision should be taken as soon as possible.
In theory, information designed to reduce uncertainty could 
be provided privately by borrowers. However, because 
borrowers may have an incentive to exaggerate their financial 
strength during economic downturns, private information 
provision may lack credibility. Moreover, uncertainty 
reduction by borrowers upstream in a credit chain may 
generate external benefits to borrowers downstream that are 
not internalized by private information providers. As a result, 
the private sector may provide less than the socially optimal 
level of uncertainty reduction. For both these reasons, 
situations may arise in which government information 
provision to reduce uncertainty may be warranted.
The remainder of this paper is divided into two sections. In 
Section 2, we provide a model of credit chain lending that 
illustrates how uncertainty can cause credit chains to break and 
how government policies that reduce uncertainty can restore 
the flow of credit. Section 3 considers potential future uses of 
uncertainty reduction policies.
2.T h e  M o d e l
Our stylized model of a credit chain has four participants: A, B, 
C, and D, and three dates: 0, 1, and 2. Participant A is a short-
term depositor who has excess funds at date 1 that he wants to 
lend until date 2. Participants B and C are banks that make long-
term loans at date 0 and short-term loans at date 1. Both loan 
types mature at date 2. Participant D is a short-term borrower 
who unexpectedly needs a loan at date 1 that matures at date 2.
We assume that some participants are familiar with each 
other’s credit risk based on a previous bilateral lending 
relationship, while others are not. In particular, A has previously 
loaned funds to B, B to C, and C to D. These relationships suggest 
a natural basis for a credit chain to form at date 1. D could 
borrow from A, B, or C. Since A and B are unfamiliar with D, a 
costly credit evaluation would be needed before either would 
extend a loan to D. Instead, C is the logical lender to D; but if C 
does not have the funds, then C will need to turn to A or B for 
funding. Because of previous relationships,  B is the logical lender 
to C, and if B needs funds then A is the logical source. Thus, a 
short-term loan from saver A is intermediated to borrower D 
along a credit chain in which bank B makes a loan to bank C 
through the interbank market (Exhibit 1).
Because many loans are intermediated through the 
interbank market, the functioning of the market is important 
for credit extension. C can lend to D only if the maximum rate 
that D can afford to pay C for a loan, denoted  , is less than 
C’s cost of funds. When C borrows from B, its cost of funds is 
equal to the risk-free rate   plus a spread   that reflects its 
credit risk. Therefore, D will be able to borrow from C only if:
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Breakdown of interbank lending
Note: If there is a breakdown of lending from B to C in the interbank market, 
the funds are trapped with bank B, and borrower D is short of funds. 
(1) .
Under normal economic conditions, the spreads that banks 
charge each other for loans are small and would not typically be 
an impediment to D’s borrowing. However, during the 
financial crisis of 2007-09, interbank spreads increased 
markedly, and lending through the interbank market declined. 
A consequence of high interbank spreads is that funds can 
become trapped at the wrong place, such as with bank B instead 
of borrower D (Exhibit 2). Whether interbank spreads increase 
at date 1 depends on B’s assessment of C’s default risk as of 
date 1. This in turn depends on C’s long-run asset portfolio and 
capital structure, both chosen at date 0.
At date 0, banks B and C both choose their long-run asset 
portfolios and capital structures. Since the main concern is B’s 
willingness to lend to C, we focus only on C’s portfolio choices 
hereafter. For simplicity, C’s long-run asset portfolio consists 
only of loans to wheat farmers (w) and oat farmers (o). The 
loans generate gross returns   and   at date 2 per dollar 
invested at date 0. The return on the loans is assumed to be 
multivariate normal.4 Bank C’s portfolio weights are   and 
 and its portfolio generates return  :5
(2) .
To finance its long-run portfolio, C is endowed with equity 
capital E and insured certificates of deposit with face value F 
that mature at date 2 and pay gross interest   at maturity.
At date 1, information   about the return on the long-term 
loans arrives. Conditional on this information, the returns on 
the loan portfolio are distributed normally with mean   and 
variance :
4 Pritsker (2009) illustrates conditions under which the average return on loans 
to a diversified group of borrowers can be approximately normally distributed 
even if the returns to individual borrowers are not. 
5 The portfolio weights are each assumed to be greater than or equal to 0 and 
to sum to 1.












where the parameters   and   depend on the portfolio 
weights as well as the means, standard deviations, and 
correlation of the assets’ returns, given the information 
available at date 1 (see Appendix A).
Additionally, recall that at date 1 bank C has the opportunity 
to extend a short-term loan to D that matures at date 2, which 
it needs to fund in the interbank market by borrowing from B.6
The spread that bank C pays on its interbank loans depends 
on bank B’s perception of the probability that C will default on 
its debt at date 2. We assume that bank C’s long-term loan 
portfolio is so much larger than its short-run lending 
opportunities that the performance of its short-run loans and 
their funding does not affect whether C will default. Under this 
assumption, C will default only if the value of its long-term 
loan portfolio at date 2 is less than what is owed on its deposits:
(4) .
From this expression, we show that bank C’s probability of 
default—and therefore the loan spread that B charges C—
depends on C’s portfolio weights, financial leverage L 
, and the parameters of the return distribution of 
C’s loan portfolio.
We assume that the risk inherent in both types of loans is 
known by bank B, as is C’s leverage, since leverage information 
is usually readily available. However, B does not know C’s 
portfolio weights. There are two cases to consider: The first is 
that B has beliefs about C’s portfolio that are sufficiently well 
formed as to be described by a unique prior probability 
distribution, which means that for each portfolio that C could 
hold, B assigns a single probability number to the likelihood 
that C could hold that portfolio. In this first case, B’s 
assessment of C’s probability of default is just a single number 
given by the sum of C’s default probability for each portfolio it 
could hold multiplied by B ’s belief about the probability that  
C will hold that portfolio.7 Because B’s assessment of C’s 
default probability is a single figure, B is not uncertain about 
C’s default probability.
The second case is that B does not know enough about C’s 
portfolio weights, and B’s beliefs cannot be described by a 
unique prior probability distribution. Instead, B may be 
uncertain about the portfolio weights and thus may hold 
6 Bank C may fund some of its short-term loans in the interbank market 
because it did not fully anticipate the short-term loan demand or because the 
interbank market is usually an inexpensive funding source.
7 For example, suppose B believes C holds only one of two portfolios, 1 or 2, and 
the probability that C holds 1 or 2 is 0.3 and 0.7, respectively. Also suppose the 
probability that portfolio 1 defaults is .01 and the probability that portfolio 2 
defaults is .02. Then, B believes the probability that C defaults is given by 
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multiple priors over the weights. Thus, B assigns a range of 
probabilities to some or all of the portfolio holdings that C may 
have. For example, if bank B is asked about the probability that 
C holds a portfolio with a weight of 0.4 in loans to oat farmers 
and 0.6 in loans to wheat farmers, B might respond that it is 
unsure, but it believes the probability ranges from 10 to 
20 percent.8
There are many reasons why B might be uncertain about C’s 
portfolio composition. For example, C may have a very complex 
portfolio, and thus researching C’s holdings in extensive detail 
may be very expensive. This may be true for C’s portfolio because 
it consists of loans to farmers, and it may be very difficult for B 
to verify which loans are to oat or wheat farmers because this 
information may not be readily available, and it may be costly to 
obtain.9 Information costs are important because many of the 
most active banks in the U.S. interbank market have more than 
$1 trillion of assets on their balance sheets, and ascertaining the 
loan composition, or even learning enough to form a unique 
prior probability distribution about the balance-sheet 
composition, can be very expensive.
A simple and parsimonious way to model multiple priors is 
to assume that bank B knows C makes only long-term loans to 
oat and wheat farmers, and that B knows C has risk 
concentration limits that prevent it from making more than 
60 percent of its loans to one type of farmer—and that is all B 
knows about C’s portfolio. Given its information, bank B 
knows that C could have a set of possible portfolios, and that 
the weight on wheat is a number t between 0.4 and 0.6 and that 
the weight on oats is  . Given bank B’s information, it does 
not know the probability that C will hold any particular 
portfolio, but it does know the probability that C will default 
on each portfolio that it could hold. From this information, 
bank B can compute a range of possible default probabilities 
for bank C. The range can be written as
   ,
meaning that based on bank B’s information about bank C, 
bank B believes C’s default probability lies within a range 
between a lower bound   and an upper bound  .
The fact that B assigns a range of possible default 
probabilities to C is precisely the type of situation described in 
the introduction to this paper. The above logic, formally 
derived in Appendix A, shows that the result of B’s uncertainty 
about C’s portfolio weights is that B assigns a range of possible 
values to C’s probability of default. The spread that B charges C 
8 Knowledge of bank B’s portfolio weight in one of the risky assets is sufficient 
to describe its portfolio because its weight in the other risky asset is 1 minus the 
weight of the first asset.
9 Gorton (2008, 2009) argues that uncertainty about the types of assets 
collateralizing asset-backed securities was an important factor behind the 
2007-09 credit crisis.
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will depend on the range of uncertainty that B has about C and 
on B’s preferences. In particular, if bank B sets spreads in an 
uncertainty-averse fashion, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989), then B will set C’s spread as if it believes C’s default 
probability is equal to  , the upper end of its range. Other 
decision rules for setting spreads in the face of uncertainty are 
plausible. It seems reasonable to believe that for many rules, all 
else equal, B would charge a higher spread when the upper end 
of the range of possible default probabilities increases.
For illustrative purposes, we assume that in the face of 
uncertainty, there are many banks like B that set spreads in an 
uncertainty-averse fashion. As a consequence, banks like C will 
pay a premium for uncertainty. More specifically, let   
denote C’s true default probability, and for simplicity assume 
that bank B is risk-neutral and uncertainty-averse. In this 
circumstance, if at date 1 bank B can invest at the risk-free rate 
between dates 1 and 2, or bank B can lend to bank C at 
interbank rate   , then for B to be indifferent between the 
two,  , which implies    is 
given by:
 .
Suppose C’s true PD at time 1 based on all information is 
. Then if   was known by B, C’s spread based on risk 
alone but not uncertainty would be
 .
Because of uncertainty and uncertainty aversion, bank C’s 
spread will consist of the risk premium   plus an additional 
uncertainty premium given by:
.
If B sets its spread based on its worst-case-scenario beliefs 
about C’s default probability, then the uncertainty premium 
will always be positive. The size of the uncertainty premium 
paid by bank C depends on C’s capital structure as well as the 
conditional expected return and volatility of its loan portfolio. 
To analyze the uncertainty premium, we compute the 
premium when C’s loan portfolio is split evenly between oats 
and wheat. Our analysis shows that the uncertainty premium 
can be very low when leverage is low, but it can also be low 
when leverage is high, provided that economic conditions are 
favorable enough. In particular, all else equal, for reasonable 
parameter values, uncertainty premia are lower when the 
volatility of the returns on both types of loans is low, when the 
expected returns on both types of loans is high, or in both 
circumstances (Charts 1 and 2).10 This explains how banks can 
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Chart 1
Uncertainty Premium as a Function of Leverage
and Loan Volatility
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Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: For the stylized risky loan portfolio held by bank C, the chart presents 
surface and contour plots of the uncertainty premium that bank C pays for its 
short-term unsecured interbank borrowing as a function of C’s leverage and 
as a function of the volatility (standard deviation) of C’s assets relative to 
their baseline volatility. 
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Note: For the stylized risky loan portfolio held by bank C, the chart presents 
surface and contour plots of the uncertainty premium that bank C pays for its 
short-term unsecured interbank borrowing as a function of C’s leverage and 
as a function of the average return on its loans when the average return on 
each loan in its portfolio is increased or decreased by the same amount. 
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of Sector Performance
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Note: For the stylized loan portfolio held by bank C, the chart presents C’s
uncertainty premium as a function of the performance of loans to wheat
farmers, one of two types of long-term loans extended by C. The chart shows
that the uncertainty premium grows when loans to wheat farmers become
more risky, and when the expected return on loans to wheat farmers decreases. 
often be uncertain about each other’s portfolio composition, 
and yet because of their choice of capital structure they can 
usually lend and borrow from each other while charging low 
spreads. The analysis also shows that banks may be able to take 
on very significant leverage during very prosperous times, and 
still pay only a small uncertainty premium. In fact, this roughly 
describes the situation prior to the global financial crisis of 
2007-09, because before that time volatility was considered 
very low by historical standards, the spread paid by banks was 
low, and yet bank leverage was fairly high (Chart 1, bottom 
panel).
During the crisis, the bursting of the housing bubble 
heralded the arrival of bad news about the housing sector. 
Interbank spreads increased appreciably because of uncertainty 
over which banks were exposed to housing—and especially 
uncertainty over which banks were exposed to subprime loans. 
To understand the same effects for bank C, suppose the bad 
news is a wheat blight that increases the likelihood that wheat 
farmers default on their loans, and thereby increases the 
volatility and decreases the expected returns on loans to wheat 
farmers. For given leverage, these changes can have a dramatic 
effect on the uncertainty premium paid by bank C. As 
illustrated in Chart 3, the bank’s uncertainty premium ranges 
from near 0 when volatility is low and expected returns are high 
to several hundred basis points when expected returns are low 
and volatility is high. The result of the elevated premium is high 
interbank spreads that cause borrowers such as D to lose access 
to their funding.
A government-sponsored stress test would reveal 
information on bank C’s solvency, through a publicly released 
assessment of C’s financial health, the release of summary 
information on C’s risk exposures, or a combination of the two. 
There is a strong case for doing both. For example, recall that 
government action may be needed to reduce uncertainty when 
the private costs of providing information to reduce uncertainty 
are too high. There are two sources of costs: The first is the cost 
of compiling and disclosing the information on risk exposures at 
the finer level of detail that is required during economic 
downturns. This is a nontrivial cost for very large banks. The 
second is the cost of processing the information on risk 
exposures to make inferences about the bank’s solvency risk. If 
the second cost is high enough, then some potential lenders to C 
will not be able to process the information on exposures, and 
thus would be unwilling to lend to C. For this reason, the 
government may have to intervene to provide processed 
information on the bank’s health, which it did as part of the 
recent Supervisory Capital Assessment Program stress testing in 
the United States. In that case, the information provided was the 
amount of capital injection required by banks to ensure capital 
adequacy during a particular stress scenario that was common 
across banks. The case for releasing better information on 
exposures is that the information provides more detail on bank 
portfolios that further reduces the uncertainty premia charged 
by lenders that can process the exposure information.
Under ideal circumstances, C’s true condition would be 
revealed by the stress tests, all uncertainty about its risk 
exposures would be eliminated, and its uncertainty spread 
would decrease to 0. More realistically, stress tests will reduce, 
but not eliminate, uncertainty spreads because although they 
may eliminate uncertainty over risk exposures, other sources of 
uncertainty may remain (such as uncertainty over the correct 
form of pricing models for some assets).
If the information revealed by the stress test about C is 
favorable enough, then C will be able to borrow from B to lend 
to D and the chain of credit will be restored. If instead it is 
learned that C’s balance sheet is weak, or its loans are not 
performing, then additional steps, such as bank equity 
injections or temporary government-sponsored guarantees on 
interbank lending, may be warranted.
Equity injections and government-sponsored loan 
guarantees can both be implemented without a stress test. 
The value-added benefit of the stress test is its ability to 
make these other steps more cost-effective if lenders are 
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Chart 4
Size of Equity Injection Required to Restore Lending
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Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: For the set of different long-term loan portfolios that bank C could 
possibly hold, indexed by omega—the fraction of long-term loans extended 
to wheat farmers—the chart presents the percentage increase in C’s equity 
(the required equity injection) that would be needed to restore C’s ability to 
acquire a short-term loan from bank B to finance a loan to borrower D. If 
bank B is uncertainty-averse, and does not know C’s portfolio, it will require a 
conservative equity injection of 50 percent before lending. If B becomes 
familiar with C’s portfolio, the required equity injection will be smaller, and 
could be negative. 
Consider first an equity injection into bank C. If bank C is 
to restart lending to borrowers such as D, a sufficient amount 
of equity must be injected to bring bank C’s spread down to the 
level
 .
If the equity injection occurs before the stress test, then B 
remains uncertain about C’s portfolio, and consequently a 
large amount of equity will be required to bring C’s loan spread 
down. This scenario is depicted in Chart 4, with details 
provided in Appendix B. In the chart, C needs to inject enough 
equity to bring its perceived probability of default down to 
2p e r c e n t .  I f  B is uncertainty-averse, it will charge spreads based 
on the most pessimistic beliefs about C’s portfolio, which 
correspond to a portfolio invested 60 percent in wheat, 
attributable to the wheat blight. In this case, C will need to 
increase the equity in the bank by about 50 percent to drive 
down B’s lending rate sufficiently so that C can lend to D.
If the stress test was instead conducted before the equity 
injection, then B would discover C’s portfolio holdings, 
eliminating the uncertainty. If B is uncertainty-averse, then 
SC RD Rf – =
because C’s holdings can be no worse than the worst case, the 
amount of equity it will need to inject is smaller. For example, 
if C’s true portfolio is split evenly in each type of loan, the size 
of the required equity injection would be only about 
20 percent, and in some cases no equity injection would be 
required.11
For similar reasons, stress tests reduce the costs and increase 
the effectiveness of government programs that guarantee 
interbank loans. To illustrate, we note that interbank loan 
guarantees are very expensive because they transfer credit risk 
from the banking system to the government. Therefore, in the 
United States the guarantees offered by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation were limited as to the amount of new 
interbank lending that was guaranteed, and banks that 
participated in the program were charged a fee based on the 
amount borrowed. While the fees and limitations on the 
amount of new loans that are covered reduce the government’s 
exposure as a guarantor of interbank loans, they also limit 
banks’ ability to borrow under these programs.
If a stress test is conducted before the loan guarantee 
program is put in place, then the test may help the market 
distinguish low- from high-risk banks. The banks that are 
identified as low risk may then be able to borrow more at better 
rates than the loan guarantee program could provide; thus, 
they could potentially increase lending while saving money.
Finally, stress tests and other programs to restart lending 
may work better in combination than alone. For example, in 
equation 1, lowering   to 0 may be insufficient to restart 
lending, and eliminating the uncertainty spread without 
lowering  may also be insufficient—but both actions 
together may be sufficient.
3.C o n c l u s i o n
When credit is provided along chains of borrowers and lenders, 
uncertainty over borrowers’ economic conditions can 
sometimes cause the flow of credit to break down. However, 
when a breakdown occurs, a central bank can take action to 
restart the flow of credit. One such action is to reduce 
uncertainty through government provision of information on 
financial intermediaries, such as banks, that are key links in 
lending chains. Information provision works by reducing those 
components of borrowers’ credit spreads attributable to 
uncertainty over their economic conditions. Because 
information provision can reduce the interest rates paid by 
borrowers, it can be viewed as a substitute for easing interest 
11 For details, see Appendix B.
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rates by other means, such as lowering central bank target rates, 
and may prove especially useful when central bank target rates 
are at their lower bounds.
Although government-sponsored information provision 
may improve the flow of credit ex post, its use has been—and 
probably should be—relatively infrequent for two reasons. 
First, gathering information is costly, and the benefits of 
providing it, in terms of lower spreads, will probably not exceed 
the costs in many circumstances. Second, government 
provision of information is a two-edged sword: It may be 
needed to reduce uncertainty ex post because private incentives 
to do the same are inadequate ex ante. However, government 
information provision ex post may further worsen private 
incentives to choose capital structures and transparent 
portfolio holdings that reduce uncertainty spreads. Thus, in the 
future, perhaps central banks should be concerned with 
uncertainty reduction ex post and with efforts to improve 
private incentives to reduce uncertainty ex ante.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 85
We show how bank B calculates a range of possible default 
probabilities for bank C when bank B is uncertain about C’s 
portfolio holdings.
As we discuss in the text, the returns on two types of loans, 
to wheat farmers (w) and to oat farmers (o), conditional on the 
information known at date 0, are multivariate normal. At 
date 1, news arrives. Conditional on  , the information that is 
known at date 1, the return on bank C’s assets is multivariate 
normal with means   and  , standard deviations   and 
, and correlation parameter  . Therefore, the conditional 
distribution of the return on the long-term loan portfolio is 




Bank C will default at date 2 under the condition in 
equation 4. The bank’s probability of default conditional on 
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where   and   are bank C’s portfolio weights,   and   
are the mean and variance of the portfolio’s return distribution 
given the portfolio weights (equations A1 and A2), and  (.) is 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.
To model uncertainty about C’s portfolio weights, we 
assume that B knows that C could have a set of possible 
portfolios, and that the weight on wheat is some number t 
between 0.4 and 0.6 and the weight on oats is  . More 
formally, C’s possible portfolios can be written as
 ,  ,  .
Given the available information, bank B does not know the 
probability that C will hold any particular portfolio; however, 
from equation A3 bank B does know the probability that C will 
default on each portfolio that it could hold. The set of default 
probabilities is given by the probability of default in the 
equation below for different choices of t:
(A4) , .
Therefore, given the set of possible portfolios, we have a 
range of possible default probabilities that bank C could have.
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Appendix A: Details of Model Derivation86 Informational Easing
We solve for the size of the equity injection needed to sustain 
interbank lending from bank B to bank C when there is 
uncertainty about bank C’s portfolio holdings and when 
bank B knows C’s portfolio composition because it has been 
revealed as part of a stress test.
When there is uncertainty about bank C’s portfolio 
holdings, an uncertainty-averse lender will assess the default 
risk as equal to  , which is the highest default probability 
that bank C could have, given its possible portfolio holdings:
,
where PD(.) is defined in equation A3. Provided that  , 
which is very plausible, Pritsker (2009) shows that PD(.) is a 
convex function of the portfolio weights. Therefore, the 
problem of solving for   maximizes a convex objective 
function over a convex set. It follows that the solution is on the 
boundary, at either t = 0.4 or t = 0.6.
Using the expression for PD(.),   can be expressed as
,
where  ;   and   are the portfolio weights for the 
portfolio that generates the maximum probability of default; 
and   and   are the mean and standard deviation, 
respectively, of the return on the portfolio that maximizes C’s 
default probability.
Solving the above equation for E, it then follows that the 
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C PDσ1 μ1 + () – []
PDσ1 μ1 +
--------------------------------------------------------- =
Let PDT, “the PD target,” denote the required maximum 
level of PD for which it is possible to support an interbank loan 
between banks B and C when B is uncertainty-averse. From the 
above equation it follows that, holding F constant, the amount 
of equity in C’s capital structure needed to reduce its maximum 
level of PD to PDT is
when information to reduce uncertainty is not provided (NI is 
no information).
When information is provided to reduce uncertainty, 
revealing C’s portfolio weights, then the amount of equity 
needed in C’s capital structure is
,
where I is information.
When uncertainty is unresolved, the percentage equity 
injection that is required is  ; when 
information is provided that resolves uncertainty, it is 
. The percentage equity injections are 












Tσ1 μ1 + () – []
PD
Tσ1 μ1 + ()
------------------------------------------------------------ =
100 ETN I , E0 1 – ⁄ () ×
100 ETI , E0 1 – ⁄ () ×
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